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Abstract. A key exchange (or agreement) protocol is designed to allow two entities establishing a
session key to encrypt the communication data over an open network. In 1990, Gunther proposed
an identity-based key exchange protocol based on the difficulty of computing a discrete logarithm
problem. Afterwards, several improved protocols were proposed to reduce the number of commu-
nication steps and the communicational cost required by Gunther’s protocol. This paper presents
an efficient identity-based key exchange protocol based on the difficulty of computing a discrete
logarithm problem. As compared with the previously proposed protocols, it has better performance
in terms of the computational cost and the communication steps. The proposed key exchange proto-
col provides implicit key authentication as well as the desired security attributes of an authenticated
key exchange protocol.
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1. Introduction
A key establishment protocol allows principals to establish a common key for encrypting
their communications over an insecure network. A two-party key exchange (or agree-
ment) protocol is used to establish a common session key for two specified entities, in
which both two entities contribute some information to derive the shared session key.
If three or more participants want to communicate securely over an insecure network,
they may employ a conference-key establishment protocol to compute a conference key
(Hwang and Yang, 1995; Ingemaresson et al., 1982; Tseng, 2005a; Tseng, 2005b). Diffie
and Hellman (1976) first proposed a secure key exchange protocol. However, it does not
allow two entities to authenticate each other, so their protocol requires an authentication
channel to exchange the public keys. According to technical categories of authentica-
tion approach, key exchange protocols may be classified into a number of categories:
public-key-based key exchange protocols (Ankney et al., 1995; ANSI, 2001; Lee and
Chang, 1996; Menezes et al., 1995; Tseng, 2002), password-based key exchange pro-
tocols (Bellovin and Merritt, 1992; Jablon, 1996; Jablon, 1997; Kwon and Song 1999),
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identity-based key exchange protocols (Gunther, 1990; Hsieh et al., 2002; Sadeednia and
Safavi–Naini, 1998; Sadeednia, 2000; Tseng et al., 2002), as well as another identity-
based key exchange protocols based on Weil pairing (Shim, 2003; Smart, 2002). Here,
we focus on the design of identity-based key exchange protocols based on the difficulty of
computing a discrete logarithm problem as (Gunther, 1990; Hsieh et al., 2002; Sadeednia
and Safavi–Naini, 1998; Sadeednia, 2000; Tseng et al., 2002).
A password-based key exchange protocol allows both two entities share a secret pass-
word in advance to provide the purposes of user authentication and key exchange. A
public-key based key exchange protocol adopts public-key cryptographic techniques to
achieve the purposes of user authentication and key exchange. On the way of key manage-
ment, although the public-key-based key exchange protocol is better than password-based
key exchange protocol. However, on-line access to get and verify public keys from a pub-
lic key system in a network system is time-consuming. Moreover, it needs to require extra
efforts to maintain public-keys in a public key system (IEEE, 2000). On the other hand,
an identity-based key exchange protocol can be regard as a variation of the public-key-
based key exchange protocol. An identity-based key exchange protocol is a protocol that
uses user’s identity or some other information combined with his identity as one’s public
key to achieve user authentication and key exchange. Thus, a verifier does not verify the
certificates of the public keys. Meanwhile, no on-line system authority is required.
Gunther (1990) first proposed an identity-based key exchange protocol based on the
difficulty of computing a discrete logarithm problem (ElGamal, 1985). However, Gun-
ther’s protocol requires four communication steps (rounds). Afterwards, several improved
protocols were proposed to reduce the number of communication steps and the communi-
cational cost required by Gunther’s protocol. Saeednia (2000) proposed an improved pro-
tocol based on Gunther’s protocol, which reduces the number of communication steps.
However, both Gunther’s protocol and Saeednia’s improved protocol require many ex-
ponentiation operations. In 2002, Hsien et al. (2002) proposed a slight modification of
Saeednia’s protocol such that the computational cost can be further reduced. Unfor-
tunately, Tseng et al. (2002) presented that their improved protocol suffers from key-
compromise impersonation attack, and proposed a new identity-based key exchange pro-
tocol.
In this paper, we will propose a new identity-based key exchange protocol based on
the difficulty of computing a discrete logarithm problem. It reduces both the computa-
tional cost and the communication steps as compared to the previously proposed proto-
cols. The proposed key exchange protocol provides implicit key authentication as well as
the desired security properties of an authenticated key exchange protocol.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The desirable security attributes
of a key exchange protocol are summarized in the next section. In Section 3, we re-
view briefly the Saeednia’s protocol and other improved protocols. Section 4 describes a
new identity-based key exchange protocol. The security analysis of the new protocol is
presented in Section 5. In Section 6, the performance comparison among the proposed
protocol and the previously proposed identity-based key exchange protocols is presented.
Section 7 gives our conclusions.
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2. Security Goals and Attributes
In the past, some desired security goals and attributes have been identified for an authen-
ticated key exchange protocol (Blake–Wilson and Menezes, 1999; Diffie et al., 1992;
Kaliski, 2001). In general, the importance of providing these security goals and attributes
is dependent on the applications. In the following, we first describe two kinds of funda-
mental security goals. An authenticated key exchange protocol should provide one of two
kinds of security goals.
1) Implicit key authentication. It means that each principal only shows the other prin-
cipal, who can compute the session key.
2) Explicit key authentication. It means that a principal is assured that another princi-
pal have actually computed the session key.
Although it is important to provide formal security proof on any cryptographic pro-
tocols, key exchange protocols remain one of the most challenging research issues. Until
now, a provably secure two-pass authenticated key exchange protocol is still an impor-
tant subject of research (Kaliski, 2001). The notion of provable security makes several
concrete security attributes to be presented as desirable.
Several desirable security attributes have been presented in the past literatures. We
summary these attributes as follows (refer to (Blake–Wilson and Menezes, 1999) a detail
discussions):
1) Known-key security. In each run of a key exchange protocol, two specified entities
should produce a unique session key. When an adversary has learned some other
session key produced by previous runs, the adversary is unable to learn some other
session key between the two entities.
2) Full forward secrecy. It means that if one’s long-term private key is disclosed to
some adversaries, they can not learn the previous session key. So this security goal
makes the secrecy of previous session key not affected, even if the long-term private
key loss. A further distinction is that a single entity’s private key is compromised or
the private keys of both participating entity are compromised. The former is called
half forward secrecy, and the latter is called full forward secrecy.
3) Key-compromise impersonation. Assume that entities A and B are two principals.
Suppose A’s secret key is disclosed. Obviously, an adversary who knows this secret
key can impersonate A to other entities. However, it is desired in some situation that
this disclosure does not allow the adversary to impersonate other entities to A.
4) Unknown key-share. When entities B believes the key is shared with some entity
C = A, and A believes the key is shared with B. The above scenario can not be
permitted. This scenario was first described in (Diffie et al., 1992).
3. Reviews of Identity-Based Key Exchange Protocols
Firstly, the Saeednia’s key exchange protocol (Saeednia, 2000) is briefly reviewed as
follow. In the system, there exists a trusted authority that is responsible for choosing sys-
tem parameters and generating a key pair for each user. In the setup phase, the authority
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chooses a large prime p such that p− 1 has a large prime factor q. Let α be an element of
order q in Z∗p . Then, the authority possess a one way hash function f() (Dobbertin, 1996;
NIST/NSA, 2005) and a key pair (x, y), in which the private key x ∈ Zq is a random
number and y = αx mod p is a public key, and publishes α, p, q, y and f().
For each user, the authority computes I = f(ID), where ID is the identity string that
may include the name, e-mail address, birthday or physical description corresponding to
the user’s identity. Then, the authority chooses a random number k in Z∗q , and computes
r = αk mod p as the user’s public key and s = Ik + xr mod q as the user’s private
key. That is, each legal user i with the identity information IDi has a key pair (ri, si).
Assumed that the users A and B are two legal users in the system. Thus, A and B have
the key pairs
(rA = αkA mod p, sA = IAkA + x · rA mod q)
and
(rB = αkB mod p, sB = IBkB + x · rB mod q),
respectively, where IA = f(IDA) and IB = f(IDB).
Thus, A and B carry out the following steps to generate the session key shared be-
tween them.
Step 1 (round 1). A selects a random number tA ∈ Zq, and computes uA = αtA mod
p. Then, A sends uA, rA and IDA to B.
Step 2 (round 2). B also selects a random number tB ∈ Zq, and computes uB =
αtB mod p. Then, B sends uB, rB and IDB to A.
Key computation. A computes the session key K as follows:
IB = f(IDB),
Z1 = usAB mod p,
Z2 = (rIBB y
rB )tA mod p,
K = Z1Z2(uB)tA mod p.
Meanwhile, B also computes the session key K as follows.
IA = f(IDA),
Z1 = (rIAA y
rA)tB mod p,
Z2 = usBA mod p,
K = Z1Z2(uA)tB mod p.
It is clear that both two entities may compute the common key K, because of
Z1 = usAB mod p = (r
IA
A y
rA)tB mod p = αtBsA mod p,
Z2 = usBA mod p = (r
IB
B y
rB )tA mod p = αtAsB mod p,
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and
K = Z1Z2(uB)tA mod p = Z1Z2(uA)tB mod p.
Note that Saeednia also presented another simple key exchange protocol, in which
the session key is K = Z1Z2 = αsAtB+sBtA mod p, but it does not provide full forward
secrecy.
Recently, Hsieh et al. (2002) proposed a slight modification of Saeednia’s key ex-
change protocol, in which the computational cost can be reduced one modular multipli-
cation and one modular exponentiation. Only the key computation phase is modified as
follows:
*Key computation. A computes the session key K as follows:
IB = f(IDB),
Z1 = utAB mod p,
Z2 = (rIBB y
rB )sA mod p,
K = Z1Z2 mod p.
Meanwhile, B also computes the session key K as follows.
IA = f(IDA),
Z1 = (rIAA y
rA)sB mod p,
Z2 = utBA mod p,
K = Z1Z2 mod p.
However, Tseng et al. (2002) have demonstrated that the above modified protocol
does not achieve the security attribute of key-compromise impersonation. In addition,
Tseng et al. also proposed another slight improvement on the key computation phase as
follows:
*Key computation. A computes the session key K as follows:
IB = f(IDB , rB),
Z1 = usAB mod p,
Z2 = (rByIB )tA mod p,
K = Z1Z2(uB)tA mod p.
Meanwhile, B also computes the session key K as follows.
IA = f(IDA, rA),
Z1 = (rAyIA)tB mod p,
Z2 = usBA mod p,
K = Z1Z2(uA)tB mod p.
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Note that the system setup phase has been modified as follows: The system authority
chooses a random number ki in Z∗q and computes ri = αki mod p as the public key
of the user i with identity IDi . Then, the system authority computes si = ki + x ·
f(IDi, ri) mod q as the corresponding user’s private key.
4. New Identity-Based Key Exchange Protocol
In the setup phase, the system has the same parameters as that of the Saeednia’s key ex-
change protocol. Any user who visits the system authority sends his IDi to the authority,
where IDi is the identity string that may include the name, e-mail address, birthday or
physical description corresponding to the user’s identity. The system authority chooses a
random number ki in Z∗q and computes ri = αki mod p as the user’s public key. Then,
the system authority computes si = ki + x · f(IDi, ri) mod q as the user’s private key.
Thus, each legal user with the identity information IDi has a key pair (ri, si). Assumed
that the users Alice (A) and Bob (B) are two legal users in the system. Thus, A and B
have the key pairs
(rA = αkA mod p, sA = kA + x · f(IDA, rA) mod q)
and
(rB = αkB mod p, sB = kB + x · f(IDB , rB) mod q),
respectively. Thus, A and B carry out the following steps to generate the session key
shared between them.
Step 1 (round 1). A selects a random number tA ∈ Zq, and computes uA = αtA mod
p. Then, A uses her private key sA to compute vA = tA+sA·uA mod q, and sends uA, rA
and IDA to B.
Step 2 (round 2). B also selects a random number tB ∈ Zq, and computes uB =
αtB mod p. Then, B uses his private key sB to compute vB = tB + sB · uB mod q, and
sends uB , rB and IDB to A.
Key computation
A computes the session key KA as follows:
ZA = rB · yf(IDB ,rB) mod p = αkB · αx·f(IDB ,rB) mod p
= αkB+x·f(IDB ,rB) mod p = αsB mod p
and
KA = (uB · (ZA)uB )vA mod p = (αtB · (αsB )uB )vA mod p
= (αtB+sBuB )vA mod p = αvAvB mod p.
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Meanwhile, B also computes the session key KB as follows.
ZB = rA · yf(IDA,rA) mod p = αkA · αx·f(IDA,rA) mod p
= αkA+x·f(IDA,rA) mod p = αsA mod p
and
KB = (uA · (ZB)uA)vB mod p = (αtA · (αsA)uA)vB mod p
= (αtA+sAuA)vB mod p = αvAvB mod p.
It is clear that A and B have the common session key K=KA =KB =αvAvB mod p.
5. Security Analysis
Here, let us discuss the security of the proposed protocol. The security of the proposed
protocol is based on the difficulty of computing the discrete logarithm problem (ElGamal,
1985) and the Diffie–Hellman scheme (Diffie and Hellman, 1976).
Firstly, we show that if an adversary eavesdrops the transmitted messages uA, rA,
IDA, uB , rB and IDB between two entities, he is unable to obtain the secret key sA of
the user A from rA and IDA, or the secret key sB of the user B from rB and IDB .
Since sA = kA + x · f(IDA, rA) mod q has two unknown variable variables kA and x
selected by the system authority, and the adversary wants to obtain two unknown variables
from the transmitted messages, he must compute kA and x from rA = αkA mod p and
y = αx mod p. Thus, it is equivalent to solving the discrete logarithm problem. In the
proposed protocol, the adversary may find ZA = rA · yf(IDA,rA) mod p = αsA . If the
adversary tries to find sA from rA · yf(IDA,rA) mod p, he still faces the difficulty of
solving the discrete logarithm problem.
Considering another situation, if an adversary eavesdrops the transmitted messages
uA, rA, IDA, uB, rB and IDB between two entities, he is still unable to obtain the
established common session key. For computing the established common session key
KA = (uB · (ZA)uB )vA mod p or KB = (uA · (ZB)uA)vB mod p, the adversary must
know vA or vB . However, both vA and vB are not transmitted in the proposed protocol.
Thus, the adversary is also unable to compute vA or vB because vA = tA+sA ·uA mod q
and vB = tB + sB · uB mod q contain the users’ secret keys sA and sB , respectively.
In the following, let us consider that any legal user i with a key pair (ri, si) is unable
to compute the secret key x of the system authority. In fact, the key pair (ri = αki mod
p, si = ki + x · f(IDi, ri) mod q) may be viewed as a Schnorr’s signature (Schnorr,
1990) generated by the system authority for the identity information IDi. Pointcheval
and Stern (1996) have shown that to compute the secret key x from (ri, si) is equal to the
difficulty of solving the Diffie–Hellman problem.
In fact, a provably secure two-pass authenticated key exchange protocol is still an
important subject of research (Kaliski, 2001). Fortunately, the notion of provable security
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makes several concrete security attributes to be identified as desirable. In the following,
let us discuss that the new proposed protocol satisfies the desirable security attributes
described in Section 2.
1) Known-key security. If the session key K is disclosed, the protocol may withstand
known-key attack. Suppose that the adversary has known a pre-session key K1
established between A and B. Since K1 = αvA1vB1 mod p, we have
K1 = αvA1vB1 mod p
= α(tA1+sAuA1)(tB1+sBuB1) mod p
= αtA1tB1+sAuA1tB1+tA1sBuB1+sAuA1sBuB1 mod p
Suppose that there is another value K2 established between A and B now. As
the same reason, we have K2 = αtA2tB2+sAuA2tB2+tA2sBuB2+sAuA2sBuB2 mod p.
First, because K1 is the multiplicative product of four items αtA1tB1 , αsAuA1tB1 ,
αtA1sBuB1 and αsAuA1sBuB1 , and each item’s exponent consists of two unknown
values, thus the adversary is unable to obtain the valid information (such as, αsAsB )
from K1. Certainly, he/she does not find another session key K2 from K1. There-
fore, the proposed protocol can withstand known-key attack.
2) Full forward secrecy. If both secret keys of A and B are disclosed, the adversary
tries to compute vA or vB , and then to compute K = αvAvB mod p. However,
to find vA or vB must require to know tA or tB from uA or uB , respectively.
Thus, this will be equivalent to solving the discrete logarithm problem. Moreover,
because of the session key K includes the value of αtAtB , which is still unknown to
the adversary. Therefore, the proposed protocol can provide full forward secrecy.
3) Key-compromise impersonation. Suppose that the secret key of B is disclosed. An
adversary who knows this secret key tries to impersonate some entity A to B.
Because of it is necessary to compute vA for impersonating A, and it must be
computed using the secret key sA of A. In such case, impersonating A to B is
impossible. Therefore, the proposed protocol can withstand key-compromise im-
personation attack.
4) Unknown key-share. The kind of attack has a precondition, which is that the public
key of the adversary must determine by oneself. Obviously, since the user’s pub-
lic key is determined by the authority, it can withstand unknown key-share attack
(Kaliski, 2001).
Finally, let us consider the security goal about key authentication. Suppose that there
are two honest entities A and B, who want to execute the proposed key exchange protocol
to establish a common session key. Since K = αvAvB mod p, other entities must know
either sA or sB to compute vA or vB for computing the session key . That is, no other
entities can learn the session key. Thus, the new key exchange protocol provides implicit
key authentication between A and B.
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6. Performance Comparison
For convenience, the following notations are used to analyze the computational cost. Tmul
is the time for modular multiplication; Texp is the time for modular exponentiation; Tf
is the time of executing the one way hash function f(); Note that the time for computing
modular addition operation is ignored, because they are much smaller than Tmul, Texp
and Tf .
As for the computational cost in our proposed protocol, any user i of two entities
must compute four values ui, vi, Zi, and K. It requires 4Texp + 3Tmul + Tf for each
entity. Table 1 demonstrates the performance comparisons among the new protocol and
the previously proposed identity-based key exchange protocols in terms of the computa-
tional cost, the number of the communication steps (rounds) and security attributes. The
previously proposed identity-based key exchange protocols are reviewed in Section III
that include Gunther’s protocol (Gunther, 1990), Saeednia’s protocol (Saeednia, 2000),
Saeednia’s simple protocol without forward secrecy (Saeednia, 2000), Hsien et al.’s pro-
tocol (Hsien et al., 2002) and Tseng et al.’s protocol (Tseng et al., 2002). From Table 1,
it is clear that the new proposed protocol has better performance than the previously pro-
posed protocols.
7. Conclusions
An identity-based key exchange protocol has an advantage, that to avoid the on-line ac-
cess of obtaining the public keys in a network environment, because of the verification
of the public key in an identity-based system is embedded in the key establishing process
between two entities. A new identity-based key exchange protocol based on the difficulty
Table 1
Comparisons among the new protocol and the previously proposed protocols
Communication Steps Computational cost Known security weakness
(the number of rounds) for each entity
Gunther’s protocol
(Gunther, 1990) 4 6Texp + 3Tmul + Tf No
Saeednia’s protocol
(Saeednia, 2000) 2 6Texp + 3Tmul + Tf No
Saeednia’s simple
protocol (Saeednia, 2000) 2 5Texp + 2Tmul + Tf Without forward secrecy
Hsieh et al.’s protocol&
(Hsien et al., 2002) 2 5Texp + 2Tmul + Tf Key-compromise impersonation
Tseng et al.’s protocol
(Tseng et al., 2002) 2 5Texp + 3Tmul + Tf No
New proposed protocol 2 4Texp + 3Tmul + Tf No
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of computing the discrete logarithm problem has been proposed. The proposed key ex-
change protocol provides implicit key authentication, and it provides the desired security
attributes of an authenticated key exchange protocol. As compared with the previously
proposed protocols, it reduces the computational cost.
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Efektyvus tapatybe˙s nustatymu pagr ↪istas apsikeitimo raktu
protokolas
Yuh-Min TSENG
Straipsnyje pasiu¯lytas efektyvus tapatybe˙s nustatymu pagr↪istas apsikeitimo slaptuoju raktu tarp
dviej ↪u vartotoj ↪u protokolas, kurio patvarumas priklauso nuo diskretinio logaritmo apskaicˇiavi-
mo sude˙tingumo. Palyginus su žinomais protokolais, jis yra pranašesnis skaicˇiavimo ištekli ↪u ir
duomen ↪u perdavimo žingsni ↪u prasme. Protokolas garantuoja rakto autentiškum ↪a ir norim ↪a ap-
sikeitimo raktu slaptum ↪a.
